Replacing property rules with liability rules : encroachment by building by Van Der Walt, A. J.
REPLACING PROPERTY RULES WITH
LIABILITY RULES: ENCROACHMENT
BY BUILDING*
A J VAN DER WALT†
South African Research Chair in Property Law and Professor,
Faculty of Law, Stellenbosch University
INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases,1 South African courts adopted a novel approach to
instances where someone builds a permanent structure on her own land in
such a way that it encroaches upon neighbouring land.2 In the Roman-
Dutch tradition,3 the default remedy was an order to have the encroachment
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1 Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). A third case, Lombard v Fischer [2003] 1 All SA 698
(O), is less interesting because of its facts. The most complete analysis of the issue,
inspired by Brian Lackey Trust, isAnne Pope ‘Encroachment or accession? The impor-
tance of the extent of encroachment in light of South African constitutional prin-
ciples’ (2007) 124 SALJ 537. See further Susan Scott ‘Recent developments in case
law regarding neighbour law and its inﬂuence on the concept of ownership’ (2005) 16
Stellenbosch LR 351 at 359–67, and on encroachment in South African law generally
C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 201–3; P J Badenhorst, Juanita M Pienaar &
Hanri Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 121–5; G A
Mulligan ‘Encroachment: Damages instead of removal’ (1956) 73 SALJ 438; J R L
Milton ‘The law of neighbours in South Africa’ 1969 Acta Juridica 123 at 237–44; J B
Cilliers & C G van der Merwe ‘The ‘‘year and a day rule’’ in South African law: Do
our courts have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of
structural encroachments on neighbouring land?’ (1994) 57 THRHR 587.
2 I am restricting my discussion to signiﬁcant encroachment by structural or
building improvements on land, where it is permanent and where it had not yet been
destroyed or demolished and where the neighbours cannot agree on a mutually
satisfactory solution.
3 I deliberately refrain from historical analysis. See Rand Waterraad v Bothma supra
note 1; Van derMerwe op cit note 1 at 201–3.
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demolished.4 Exceptions were possible in cases where the effects of the
encroachment were minimal.5 In the two cases under discussion, the
encroachments deprived the landowners of the use and enjoyment of their
land, but the courts nevertheless refused to grant a demolition order,
awarding compensation instead. This raises the question whether these
owners had been forced into a compulsory transfer of their land (or rights in
their land) — for if they were, this would have constitutional implications.
Anne Pope has indicated that, for purposes of Roman-Dutch law, the
problem is to decide whether a legal dispute arising from cases such as these
should be treated as a question of attachment (accession) or as a neighbour
dispute.6 If it is treated as an attachment problem, as suggested by the default
position, the central principle is that a permanent structure attaches to the
land and belongs to the landowner, who can have it demolished.
Accordingly, once it is decided that the attachment is permanent, the change
in ownership follows by operation of law and the landowner can dispose of
the encroaching structure.7 If encroachment is treated as a neighbour
dispute, it appears that it is possible that, in some instances, the encroacher
might retain possession of the encroachment against payment of compensa-
tion. In this case, the question is whether the encroacher acquires ownership
(or another right) in the land. Pope has suggested that the operation of
accession is suspended in cases where compensation is ordered instead of
demolition, so that the encroaching part of the building does not attach to
the land but belongs to the owner of the land upon which the main structure
is built, while the affected landowner retains ownership of the land upon
which the encroachment infringes.8 Any other explanation would not
account for the fact that the affected landowner is prevented from dealing
with the encroachment as an attachment permanently afﬁxed to her land.
Stated differently, the problem is whether conﬂicts arising from encroach-
ment should be resolved with reference to real (property) remedies (in the
form of an order to abate the interference with the landowner’s rights) or
personal remedies (in the form of compensation). In law-and-economics
terminology one could frame this question as being one of whether property
rules (injunctive relief) should be replaced with liability rules (compensa-
4 The statement in Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit note 1 at 122 that the
landowner has a choice between three remedies (demolition, taking possession of the
encroachment and paying compensation for the improvement or transfer of the land)
is misleading. The courts exercise the discretion to award compensation; there is no
indication that they will give the landowner a choice.
5 Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 201–3; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit
note 1 at 122.
6 This is the formulation of Pope op cit note 1 at 537–56.
7 On the principles of attachment (or accession of movables to land through
building), see Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit note 1 at 121–5; compare further
Pope op cit note 1 at 537–6.
8 Ibid. It is not clear how this explanation would work in a case of total encroach-
ment.
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tion), based on efﬁciency and justice considerations.9 In the Bothma and Brian
Lackey Trust cases, the courts justiﬁed the move to liability rules with
reference to civilian property dogma, complemented by considerations of
reasonableness. Both judgments also referred to English law and to efﬁciency
considerations, which suggests that the move from property rules to liability
rules could be evaluated with reference both to comparative law and to
law-and-economics logic.
In the following section, the facts and the decisions in the Bothma and
Brian Lackey Trust cases will be set out and explained, followed by a doctrinal,
comparative and economic analysis of the proposed solutions. In the
penultimate section it is pointed out that the move to liability rules has
constitutional implications, and in the concluding section the proposed
solutions are evaluated and a way forward for SouthAfrican law is suggested.
THE RECENT CASES
In Bothma the respondent erected permanent structures on the unimproved
land of the plaintiff, together with a house built halfway across the unmarked
boundary line. The applicant approached the High Court for a mandatory
interdict to demolish the structures or the encroaching parts thereof. The
court emphasized that the question whether it had a discretion to grant
compensation instead10 had not been central to earlier SouthAfrican cases on
this issue.11 In so far as courts discussed the matter, some held that there was
no such discretion,12 while others found equitable reasons, often based on
English law,13 why there should be one.14 Arguments in favour of a judicial
9 This formulation emerges from the (law-and-economics) discourse developing
in response to Guido Calabresi &ADouglas Melamed ‘Property rules, liability rules,
and inalienability: One view of the cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089; in turn
inspired by Frank I Michelman ‘Pollution as a tort: A non-accident perspective on
Calabresi’s Costs’ (1971) 80 Yale LJ 647. Both articles were inﬂuenced by Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld ‘Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial rea-
soning’ (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16 and idem ‘Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in
judicial reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale LJ 710.
10 Rand Waterraad v Bothma supra note 1 at 130F-G.
11 Ibid 130H, citing Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360; Hornby v Municipality of
Roodepoort-Maraisburg 1918 AD 278; Higher Mission School Trustees v Grahamstown
Town Council 1924 EDL 354; De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Town Council of
Roodepoort-Maraisburg v Posse Property (Pty) Ltd 1932 WLD 78; Naude v Bredenkamp
1956 (2) SA 448 (O); Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd v Mitchmor Invest-
ments (Pty) Ltd 1971 (2) SA 397 (W); Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D); Wassung v
Simmons 1980 (4) SA753 (N).
12 The most important case in this group is Higher Mission School Trustees v Graham-
stown Town Council supra note 11 at 366 (the court could ﬁnd no authority).
13 See particularly Higher Mission School Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council supra
note 11 at 366 (there is authority in English law, but the court could ﬁnd no authority
in Roman-Dutch law); Town Council of Roodepoort-Maraisburg v Posse Property (Pty) Ltd
supra note 11 at 87 (English law followed).
14 The most important cases in this group are Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort-
Maraisburg supra note 11 at 290 (if damages would satisfy justice the courts would be
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discretion to grant compensation instead of demolition were often inﬂu-
enced by considerations of fairness and equity. Hattingh J decided that the
courts do have a discretion to grant either demolition or compensation. He
relied on two main arguments. First, South African law allows the courts a
similar discretion to refuse a claim for speciﬁc performance, even when the
respondent is in a position to deliver, which conﬁrms that the enforcement
of rights cannot be absolute.15 (His example from contract is, however,
questionable because he did not consider the fact that, in the situation at
hand, replacing injunctive relief with compensation amounts to a shift from
property to contract.) Secondly, South African neighbour law is a collection
of casuistic rules and principles aimed at harmonizing the property interests
of owners of neighbouring land. It is widely accepted that, if these principles
and rules cannot produce an equitable result, the general reasonableness
standard of neighbour law should apply as a corrective measure.16 This
principle applied in Holland when Grotius described the Roman-Dutch law
of his time, and it therefore also applies in SouthAfrica.17 For purposes of the
second argument the court assumed that the reasonableness standard in
South African neighbour law is similar to the equity principle in English law.
The reasonableness principle, as described by Hattingh J, is understood as a
guarantee that enforcement of one neighbouring landowner’s rights may not
cause excessive harm or loss to her neighbour. In a case where enforcement
of one owner’s right would cause great harm or loss for another, the actual or
potential harm or loss should, in the court’s view, be divided equally between
them.18 The reason for this equitable arrangement is explained with
reference to the notion, formulated by Pothier and developed by Van der
Linden, that neighbours’ use of their respective contiguous land creates a
natural obligation or quasi contract that reciprocally obliges each neighbour
not to disturb the other in their normal and reasonable use of the
properties.19 The fact that the reasonableness principle or quasi contract
creates a reciprocal duty between neighbours not to use their land so as to be
a nuisance to the other was not considered by the court, and neither were the
differences between nuisance and encroachment.
slow to order demolition); De Villiers v Kalson supra note 11 at 231 (no hard and fast
authority that the courts have no discretion); Town Council of Roodepoort-Maraisburg v
Posse Property (Pty) Ltd supra note 11 at 87 (if the injury could be compensated fully by
money and the injury caused by demolition were to be serious, the courts would
grant compensation); Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd v Mitchmor Invest-
ments (Pty) Ltd supra note 11 at 405D (authority in favour of discretion).
15 Rand Waterraad v Bothma supra note 1 at 133D-F.
16 Ibid 133F-134E.
17 Ibid 135D.
18 Ibid 136D-E.
19 Ibid 136F-I, referring to Robert-Joseph Pothier Traité du Contrat de Societé:
2ieme Appendice (1775) para 230 and Johannes van der Linden’s Dutch translation:
Verhandeling van het Recht omtrent Sociëteiten of Compagnieschappen en Andere Gemeen-
schappen (1802).
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On the basis of these arguments, Hattingh J concluded that Roman-
Dutch law allowed the development of an equitable rule to supplement the
established principles of neighbour law in instances where protection of one
neighbour’s rights will cause unjustiﬁed harm to another. In doing so,
Hattingh J opined, the courts would be intent on placing the emphasis where
it belongs, namely the neighbour relationship as such, rather than on
individual neighbours’ rights. The effect would be to distribute the harm or
loss equitably between the neighbours, rather than merely enforcing one
neighbour’s right with no regard to the effect that it has on the other. The
court emphasized that such a deviation from established principles could
occur only by way of high exception, in order to ensure justice and equity.20
In the present case, the court concluded, application of this exceptional
equity principle was justiﬁed and suitable, particularly in view of the fact that
the encroachment had been allowed to exist for a long time, even after the
plaintiff had become aware of it, thereby demonstrating the absence of
urgency and real harm for the plaintiff, whereas granting a demolition order
would cause signiﬁcant loss for the respondent.21 In Bothma, the application
for a demolition order was therefore denied and the encroacher was left in
possession of the encroachment.
The court did not make any ruling with regard to the implications of its
decision for ownership of the affected land. Although the landowner would
lose the use of signiﬁcant portions of its land, the court did not make any
ruling about loss of rights in the land by the owner or acquisition of rights in
the land by the encroacher. Despite the fact that the respondent offered to
pay compensation, the court did not make a compensation order either,
because the plaintiff never proved any loss or damage.
In Brian Lackey Trust the plaintiff inadvertently built a house in such a way
that it encroached 80 per cent on the property of the defendant.22 When a
building inspector discovered the error, the plaintiff offered to buy the
affected plot from the defendant, but they could not agree on a price and the
defendant demanded that the building be demolished. An interesting feature
of the case is the fact that the action was brought not by the aggrieved
landowner, but by the encroaching party, who applied for a declaratory order
that the defendant ‘was disentitled to the removal . . . of the encroachment
. . . subject to payment of such damages (if any) as the Court may
determine’.23 The applicant was therefore in effect claiming the right to
20 Ibid 138C-H.
21 Ibid 138H-139I.
22 The plaintiff owned two undeveloped plots next to an undeveloped plot
belonging to the defendant. The new house that the plaintiff built was intended to
straddle the boundary line between its two plots, but was built across the boundary
line of its one plot and that of the defendant instead. When the mistake was dis-
covered the house was within weeks of completion. It was accepted that both parties
were unaware of the mistake until the mistake was discovered by a building inspector:
Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale supra note 1 para 5.
23 Ibid paras 9 and 10.
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retain possession of the encroachment, against the affected landowner’s will,
on payment of compensation. In response, the defendant ﬁled a counter-
claim for an order to remove the parts of the building that encroached upon
its land.
As in the Bothma case, the Cape High Court considered the question
whether it had a discretion to order ‘what in effect amounts to an involuntary
deprivation of property’.24 The parties agreed that the courts have a
discretion to order damages instead of demolition, but the defendant insisted
that such discretion is limited to trivial encroachment, whereas the plaintiff
argued that the court had a wide discretion based on considerations of
equity.25 The court also referred to English law, where the courts employ a
‘working rule’ to the effect that a damages award can be granted instead of
injunctive relief in exceptional circumstances, where the injury to the
affected landowner is small and can be compensated by a small money
payment. Although the alternative form of relief in damages is exceptional
and cannot be used to oblige the affected landowner to sell his land against
compensation,26 it has been stated in English case law that damages could be
awarded instead of an injunction in cases of trivial encroachments, or where
the plaintiff was plainly just out to get money or to be vexatious or
oppressive, where it would clearly be unjust to give him more than
pecuniary relief, or in any other instance where a damages award proves to
be an adequate remedy.27 However, the court cautioned that English
authority had to be used carefully because of the differences between the two
systems.28
Eventually, the High Court agreed with the decision in Bothma that it has a
wide discretion to grant damages instead of demolition on the basis of
fairness, although such discretion cannot be unfettered.29 It could not ﬁnd
any reason to restrict the discretion to trivial or minor encroachments,
arguing that ‘it makes no sense . . . to allow trivial or minor encroachments
to remain, while being obliged to order removal of substantial or ‘‘massive’’
encroachments’.30
The court assumed that a landowner is ordinarily entitled to remove
encroachments on her land.31 Weighing the effects of demolition in this case
against compensation, the court decided that demolition would produce an
24 Ibid para 16.
25 Ibid para 120.
26 Ibid para 22, referring to the ChanceryAmendmentAct 1858, s 2 and to Shelfer v
City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 (CA); Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 2All
ER 189 (CA); Holland v Worley (1884) LR 26ChD 578 at 587.
27 Ibid para 25, referring to Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co supra note 26
at 316–17; Fishenden v Higgs and Hill Ltd [1935] 153 LT 128 (CA) at 139, 141; Jaggard v
Sawyer supra note 26 at 208ff.
28 Ibid para 24.
29 Ibid paras 27 and 30.
30 Ibid para 29.
31 Ibid para 32.
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unjust result because the prejudice caused by demolition would far outweigh
the prejudice caused to the affected landowner if he were to receive
compensation instead of injunctive relief32 and in light of the general
principles of fairness and reasonableness in neighbour law.33 An important
consideration was that a landowner should not be allowed to use her
bargaining power to extract an unreasonably high amount from the
encroacher, especially if it is clear that the landowner is, in principle, willing
to accept money.34 In other words, a landowner who suffers prejudice from
encroachment by a neighbour should not be allowed to use the sword of
injunctive relief to establish a holdout situation and so to extract extortionate
compensation. The court concluded that the defendant was attempting to do
just that and held that a remedy in damages ‘would fully meet the case’.35
Neither the Bothma nor the Brian Lackey Trust case came to any conclusion
regarding the status of the land on which the encroachment was situated, and
yet the encroachments in both cases were signiﬁcant enough to imply, once
the demolition order was denied, that the affected landowners would be
prevented from using their land. In neither case was it established (or even
considered) whether the encroacher acquired any rights in the land affected
by the encroachment, nor was the question asked whether the land could or
should be transferred to the encroacher by way of a forced sale.
In explaining the discretion to order compensation rather than the
demolition of an encroachment, Van der Merwe adds that the courts can
also, if they judge it to be fair, order the encroacher to take transfer of the
neighbour’s land upon which he encroached, the only question being the
amount of compensation for the compulsory sale.36 Van der Merwe ﬁnds
support for this view in older decisions, the most recent of which
emphasized that compensation was the primary remedy and that an order to
take transfer of the affected land was incidental to the primary remedy.37 On
the face of it, these cases create the impression that the courts have the
authority to order transfer of the affected land to the encroacher, in addition
to compensation, when it is practicable to do so.38 However, it is not clear
32 Ibid para 36. At paras 37 and 39 the court explained that monetary compensa-
tion, including solatium, would compensate the defendant for his losses, whereas the
plaintiff would receive no compensation for his losses if demolition is ordered.At para
38 the court added that the courts are loathe to order demolition of ‘economically
valuable building works’.
33 Ibid para 40.
34 Ibid para 41.
35 Ibid para 44.
36 Van derMerwe op cit note 1 at 202–3.
37 Meyer v Keiser supra note 11 at 507. See further Christie v Haarhoff (1886–1887) 4
HCG 349; Greeff v Krynauw (1899) 9 CTR 591; Van Boom v Visser supra note 11;
Wade v Paruk 1904 25 NLR 219; De Villiers v Kalson supra note 11. Another unre-
ported case is mentioned byMulligan op cit note 1 at 438.
38 In Meyer v Keiser supra note 11 the plaintiff challenged the assumption that the
court had the authority to grant such an order, but the challenge was overruled on the
authority of Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 129; Hahlo op cit note 1; J E Scholtens
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that the early cases succeeded in keeping apart the discrete issues of the
discretion to grant compensation instead of demolition and the authority to
order transfer of the land. These decisions establish slender support for the
existence of such an exceptional judicial authority, namely to order a
compulsory sale of land, in a jurisdiction where the power of expropriation is
reserved to the state and available only when the power is granted in
authorizing legislation39 — and it remains unclear from where the authority
for that power derives. There is no conclusive indication that such a power
existed at common law, and s 33 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937
merely creates the registration procedure for bringing the deeds register in
line with original changes in ownership; it does not grant such a power to the
courts.
It is highly unlikely that a building erected in such a way that it
signiﬁcantly encroaches upon the land of another person would comply with
building regulations and approved building plans, especially in urban areas.
Planning and building permissions are enforced quite strictly in most states,
and in this respect South Africa is no exception. Despite the court’s remarks
in Brian Lackey Trust about its aversion to ordering the demolition of
economically valuable buildings,40 it must be asked whether an illegal
building will, and should be, allowed to stand or proceed, purely from the
perspective of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the building falls.
In recent cases the South African courts have been willing to order the
demolition of buildings erected without, or in conﬂict with, building
regulations. Van Rensburg v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality41 shows
that an encroachment dispute might be settled by a demolition order
obtained by the local authority, particularly when the building project was
undertaken without building permission or in contravention of building,
planning or conservation legislation. Interestingly, the court relied on
encroachment language, arguing that the offending builder, by erecting
‘Infringement and protection of ownership’ 1956 Annual Survey of South African Law
129–136; Christie v Haarhoff supra note 37: in this case (at 356) the court remarked
that a solatium had to be paid because the transfer ‘practically amounts to a compul-
sory expropriation’.
39 See Antonie Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 2 ed (2001) 9–10; Pretoria City Council v
Modimola 1966 (3) SA250 (A) at 258G.
40 Ibid.
41 [2007] 4 All SA 950 (SE). There was some confusion about the legality of the
building works and the planning permission, but eventually it was clear that the
offending owner was acting with blatant disregard for both the rights of his neigh-
bours and the requirements of the local authority. It was also clear that permission for
the building works could not be granted lawfully due to a restrictive condition regis-
tered in favour of the neighbours. See further Barnett v Minister of Land Affairs 2007 (6)
SA 313 (SCA) (demolition of valuable holiday houses erected without planning per-
mission); Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape 2007 (4) SA 26 (C)
(demolition of building works initiated without the necessary permit from heritage
authorities, even when the affected building on the same plot was not proclaimed or
registered).
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unauthorized building works on his own land in contravention of a restrictive
condition registered in favour of neighbouring land, was encroaching upon the
rights of the neighbouring landowner, who was entitled to have the buildings
demolished, even though the buildings did not physically encroach upon the
land of the neighbour.
DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE
Abuse of right and reasonableness
In Brian Lackey Trust the court suggested that the defendant, by insisting
upon its counterclaim for a demolition order, was somehow acting
improperly:
‘[T]he defendant’s attitude and his counterclaim in these proceedings are based
on anachronistic concepts of ownership: it represents a rigid and dogmatic
insistence upon his perceived absolute rights as owner, irrespective of broader
considerations of social utility, economic waste and neighbourliness.’42
The notion of so-called absolute ownership and the assumption that the
entitlements of ownership are unrestricted by social, economic or moral
considerations are anachronistic and no longer accepted, if they ever were
accepted.43 It is also true that neighbour law, more than any other area of
property law, demonstrates that ownership, especially of land, cannot be
understood or enforced in terms of absolute entitlements. In a neighbour-
law setting, where use of one piece of land inevitably affects neighbouring
owners, each owner’s entitlements are reciprocally limited by the entitle-
ments of other owners. In South African neighbour law, the reasonableness
principle embodies the insight that owners cannot exercise their own rights
without regard for the rights of others.44 However, the reasonableness
principle applies mostly in nuisance cases and it is not clear that it can be
applied to encroachment disputes as if the issues were identical.
In nuisance cases, the reasonableness principle implies that the rights of
one owner end where the rights of others begin; accordingly, neighbouring
owners must exercise their use entitlements — and accept the exercise of use
entitlements on neighbouring land — in a spirit of reciprocal respect and
accommodation. In terms of this principle neighbours are expected, on the
one hand, to use their own land reasonably so as not to cause noise, pollution
or other infringements on neighbouring land and, on the other hand, to
42 Ibid para 43. Contrast this with Christie v Haarhoff supra note 37 at 355, where
Laurence J stated that he could not ﬁnd fault with the plaintiff for claiming a much
higher sum of compensation than the court would be willing to award, although he
was surprised that the defendants, being unlawful encroachers, were not more
ﬂexible in their offer of compensation.
43 See eg D P Visser ‘The ‘‘absoluteness’’ of ownership: The South African
common law in perspective’1985 Acta Juridica 39.
44 Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 190–5; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit
note 1 at 111–13.
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accommodate and to accept the inevitable immissions (noise, smoke, smells
and so on) caused by similar reasonable and normal use of neighbouring
land.45 In all these cases, the duty to act reasonably and to accept the effects of
reasonable use of neighbouring land is premised upon the notion of normal
use for that kind of land in that area and at that time.46 However, when one
neighbour makes abnormal or unlawful use of his land, other neighbours are
not bound by the reasonableness requirement to accept that use in a spirit of
neighbourliness, because, logically, unlawful use automatically moves
outside the framework of normal use and thereby suspends the principles of
reciprocity and reasonableness. Consequently, application of the reasonable-
ness principle is neither self-evident nor clear in cases of encroachment. The
encroacher is not exercising his rights lawfully or normally when he builds
on the neighbour’s land, nor is he merely exercising his rights when
attempting to retain possession (and even acquire ownership) of the
encroachment. Building works that encroach on neighbouring land
unlawfully infringe the neighbour’s property rights exactly because the
encroaching party is exceeding the limits of his own rights and infringing on
the rights of others. The innocent landowner who is protecting her rights
against encroachment by insisting upon demolition is, therefore, not in the
same position as the neighbour who is expected to accept a certain,
reasonable amount of noise from neighbouring properties — there is no
reasonable measure of encroachment that neighbouring owners have to
accept in a spirit of reciprocal neighbourliness. To suggest that a landowner
who refuses to accept an encroachment on her land and who refuses to
accept involuntary loss of the land, even against compensation, is somehow
abusing her right begs the question.47 An owner who stands to lose her
property by way of a forced sale and who holds out for higher compensation
is not abusing her right; she is defending her right of ownership against
involuntary loss.48 In law-and-economics terminology it would be said that
the market should be allowed to assign the property to whoever puts the
highest value on it — if the price demanded by the unwilling landowner is
too high, the encroacher is always able to cut his losses and abandon or
demolish the encroachment.
45 See recently Allaclas Investments (Pty) Ltd v Milnerton Golf Club 2008 (3) SA 134
(SCA); PGB Boerdery Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Somerville 62 (Edms) Bpk 2008 (2) SA
428 (SCA). Cf in general Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 190–6 and Badenhorst,
Pienaar &Mostert op cit note 1 at 111.
46 Ibid at 112.
47 See generally Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 193; Badenhorst, Pienaar &
Mostert op cit note 1 at 117–19.
48 In German constitutional case law the mere fact of compensation does not in
itself justify expropriation — the expropriation has to be justiﬁed independently by
the importance of the public purpose. If the purpose for which property was expro-
priated is not eventually realized by the public use of that property, the original
landowner can claim retransfer. See A J van der Walt Constitutional Property Law
(2005) 220.
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When it is considered appropriate to order compensation rather than
demolition in encroachment cases, this choice can therefore not be justiﬁed
with regard to reasonableness arguments that apply in nuisance cases. In
encroachment cases, reasonableness refers to something different from the
reciprocal respect and forbearance associated with it in the nuisance context,
and, if the case law is any guide, the English notion of equity is closer to what
courts have in mind when deciding not to enforce demolition in a particular
case. In these cases, equity (fairness) comes into play when, for policy
reasons, the harm that will result for the encroacher if the encroachment is
demolished is weighed up against the potential harm or loss that will follow
for the affected landowner if the encroachment is not demolished. When the
courts in such a case make a policy call based on the balance of harm, one
owner — who might be entirely innocent — could be forced to bear loss
purely in order to avoid much greater loss for another.
In Brian Lackey Trust the court could not see why it should allow
insigniﬁcant encroachments to be compensated by a money award while
large encroachments had to be demolished.49 The answer to this apparent
conundrum depends on whether one sees the matter from the perspective of
the encroacher or the affected landowner. All other things being equal,
insigniﬁcant encroachments do not cause much harm and they can be left in
place more readily; large encroachments cause greater harm and therefore
demolition has to be a more serious possibility. Contrary to what the two
cases suggest, compensation should be easier to justify in the case of
insigniﬁcant encroachments, while demolition should be a serious option in
case of large or signiﬁcant encroachments. This perspective only becomes
clear when one leaves the logic of reasonable exercise of reciprocal rights and
duties behind and considers the matter from the perspective of the
landowner affected by an unlawful infringement not covered by the
reasonableness standard. An encroaching building is simply not one of the
results of normal and reasonable use of contiguous land.
Acquisition of rights by operation of law
Compensation is exceptional as a solution where ownership in (or use of)
land is lost involuntarily to an outsider who infringed the owner’s rights, but
there are institutions in Roman-Dutch property law where similar solutions
apply to comparable dilemmas, especially in the area of original acquisition of
property.50 Common to all these cases is the principle that the law
49 Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale supra note 1 para 29.
50 The courts in Bothma and Brian Lackey Trust referred to examples from contract,
speciﬁcally instances when an order for speciﬁc performance can be denied for equi-
table reasons. In South African contract law a contracting party can usually insist on
speciﬁc performance (see Rand Waterraad v Bothma supra note 1 at 133). Law-and-
economics literature indicates that reliance on the speciﬁc-performance example
provides less-than-perfect authority for a principled choice between injunctive and
compensatory relief in a property case.
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sometimes, for policy reasons, allows a non-owner to beneﬁt from (often
unlawful) interaction with the property, while the innocent owner loses her
rights and must be satisﬁed with compensation. The obvious case is original
acquisition of ownership through attachment (accession) by building. If
anybody (including the owner) attaches movables to land permanently,
ownership in the movable building materials is lost when the movables cease
to exist as independent objects of rights and become part of a composite
object, of which the land is always the principal part, with the result that the
owner of the land will subsequently own the land that has been improved by
the addition of the movables.51 In some instances the previous owner of the
movables might have a claim, based on unjustiﬁed enrichment, against the
landowner. Similar shifts in ownership take place by operation of law when
someone uses movable property belonging to another to create a new
movable, for instance by making wine with the grapes of another person.
What is common to all these examples is that one person is exposed to
potential loss, even if she was innocent; that the damaging consequences are
brought about by operation of law; and that the application of the legal
principles results from a policy call or value judgement aimed at prevention
of more serious loss accruing to another party or to society at large if the
dispute were solved purely with reference to the stronger rights of the
innocent owner. In some cases all or part of the loss might be recoverable
through a claim for compensation based on unjustiﬁed enrichment or on
delict. An important feature of these examples is that there always is either
common-law or statutory authority for the involuntary, original loss and
acquisition of ownership.
Pope52 indicates that attachment principles normally favour the affected
landowner in encroachment cases, in the sense that these principles provide
that movables that had been attached to land permanently lose their
independent existence, with the result that the landowner (to whom all
permanent structures also belong) can either retain the encroachment (in
which case the encroacher might have an enrichment claim) or demolish it.
However, she also shows that the courts sometimes, in an as yet undeﬁned
group of instances, exercise a discretion to suspend the legal operation of
attachment principles in order to create the possibility of an alternative
outcome, namely to leave the encroaching building works in place and order
compensation in favour of the affected landowner. On the surface, it seems
that this option is preferred when the loss for the encroacher (that would
result from demolition) is unjustiﬁably higher than the loss for the landowner
(should the encroachment be left in place).53 In those cases the encroacher
might be allowed to beneﬁt from his unlawful action in the sense that the
operation of attachment principles is suspended, so that the encroaching
51 See Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 247; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit
note 1 at 247–54.
52 Pope op cit note 1 at 537.
53 Ibid at 544.
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building does not attach to the neighbouring land but to the ‘land of origin’
belonging to the encroacher.54 In other words, the court exercises its
discretion to prevent the landowner from acquiring ownership by accession,
instead opting for a solution that apparently involves the encroacher
acquiring a right in the affected landowner’s land by operation of law.
Generally speaking, both South African case law and literature are not too
clear about the implications of denying the innocent landowner affected by a
signiﬁcant encroachment upon her land a demolition order. In Bothma the
court failed to address the issue and the encroacher was not required to pay
compensation either, since the applicant did not prove any loss. In Brian
Lackey Trust the court also left the encroachment in place, thereby effectively
depriving the affected landowner of the use of her land, without saying
anything about ownership of the land affected by the encroachment.
Especially in cases where the encroachment is signiﬁcant, one party could
effectively lose control over and use of the property while another effectively
gains control over and use of it. Unless the change in their respective rights in
the land is formalized and reﬂected in the deeds registry, this situation can
cause great uncertainty, as has been pointed out in commentary on Bothma
and Brian Lackey Trust.55
The most important issues resulting from this situation are, ﬁrst, questions
of principle about the legal position of the respective parties (does the
plaintiff lose ownership and does the defendant acquire ownership of the
encroached-upon land?) and, secondly, practical questions about the position
of third parties (can they rely on the impression created by possession?)56 and
about responsibility for insurance of the property and for land taxes.
In regard to the encroacher’s right in the affected land, three more speciﬁc
questions should be distinguished. The ﬁrst question is whether the
encroacher automatically acquires a right in the land if the court refuses to
grant a demolition order and, instead, orders compensation. It seems clear
from the case law that the encroacher does not automatically acquire
ownership of the affected land. If the court refuses a demolition order
without ordering transfer of the land (as in both Bothma and Brian Lackey
Trust), the principles of attachment are apparently suspended, with the result
that the encroaching building work does not attach to the neighbouring land
but simply extends over it. (The opposite effect, whereby the encroacher
would acquire ownership of the land by building on it, is precluded by the
principles of accession, according to which the land is always the principal
thing in cases where composite things are created through permanent
attachment.) The question is, therefore, whether the encroacher acquires a
lesser right in the land when the court refuses to order demolition, in which
case compensation is intended to recompense the landowner for the loss of
use of her land. If such an explanation could be devised it would obviously
54 Ibid at 545.
55 Ibid at 543; Scott op cit note 1 at 361.
56 Ibid at 365.
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imply a less intrusive and less controversial infringement of the affected
landowner’s rights than automatic loss of ownership would entail. In a few
exceptional cases, limited real rights can be acquired by operation of law:
acquisitive prescription, expropriation of a servitude and acquisition of a
right of way of necessity are signiﬁcant examples. The origin of these rights
could either be legislation (eg the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, the
Prescription Act 18 of 1943 or the Prescription Act 68 of 1969) or a court
order based on common-law principles.57 However, although logic suggests
that refusal of a demolition order, in the absence of an order to transfer the
land, automatically vests a personal right (such as a lease or a limited real right
such as a servitude) in the encroacher, and even though it might perhaps be
argued that the applicable common-law principles could, in suitable
instances, authorize such a result (much as in the case of a way of necessity),
this issue has not been cleared up in the case law as far as encroachment is
concerned.
The second question concerns the granting of an ancillary court order to
the effect that the land must be transferred to the encroacher: what could the
source of the authority for such a forced transfer (or original loss and
acquisition) of ownership be? Van der Merwe claims that the courts can
order transfer of ownership in encroachment cases,58 although neither the
common law nor legislation provides speciﬁcally for such a forced transfer of
ownership. The only authority for the proposition that the courts can make
such an order consists of a few inconclusive older cases, of which Meyer v
Keiser59 is the latest. There are of course instances in SouthAfrican law where
ownership of land ‘shifts’ from one person to another by operation of law,
expropriation and acquisitive prescription being the most obvious. How-
ever, in those cases the authority for the loss and acquisition of ownership
derives from legislation (e g, once again, the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975,
the Prescription Act 18 of 1943 or the Prescription Act 68 of 1969). In the
absence of legislation or common-law authority for such a possibility in the
case of encroachment, it is very difﬁcult to see how the forced transfer of
ownership of land by court order can be justiﬁed.60 However, as already
mentioned, it is not at all clear that the South African courts have the
authority to order the transfer of land from one owner to another, even
against payment of compensation, when such a transfer amounts to a sale
against the will of the affected landowner. In my view, the courts simply do
not have that authority and the cases that suggest otherwise are mistaken. In
any event, to propose that the courts should have such authority based purely
57 Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 484–92; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit
note 1 at 328–30.
58 Van derMerwe op cit note 1 at 202–3.
59 1980 (3) SA504 (D).
60 See Pope op cit note 1 at 547. Section 33 of the Deeds RegistriesAct 47 of 1937
merely provides the procedure for bringing the register in line; it does not provide
authority for the change in ownership.
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on considerations of fairness is in conﬂict with the basic premises of South
African property law.
The third question concerns registration. The South African registration
system is a negative one which will normally not reﬂect real rights in land
that vested through original acquisition (by operation of law).61 Ordinarily, it
will be necessary to amend the deeds register to reﬂect changes that occurred
through acquisitive prescription or expropriation.62 Section 33 of the Deeds
Registries Act 47 of 1937 provides the procedure for bringing the deeds
register in line with a change in ownership. However, this provision merely
provides the instrument for correcting the register; it does not authorize the
transfer. The same principle holds in case of a limited real right being created
by operation of law in favour of the encroacher: the negative system will not
reﬂect such a right and the register will have to be amended.
Justifying the compensation award
The decision to opt for compensation in lieu of demolition in Bothma and
Brian Lackey Trust can, however, be explained and justiﬁed along doctrinal
lines (at least as far as Roman-Dutch law is concerned) with reference to
encroachment principles and without reference to the equity (or ‘reason-
ableness’) argument the courts seemed to prefer. One argument (although it
played no role in either Bothma or Brian Lackey Trust) is that insigniﬁcant
encroachments are more readily left intact (against payment of compensa-
tion) since, dogmatically speaking, harm caused by a small encroachment is
usually so small that demolition would appear outrageous. Of course, in
some instances a dispute caused by a very small encroachment might be
easier to solve by way of demolition, depending upon the circumstances. To
demolish the last few inches of an encroaching freestanding wall might offer
an easy solution; to demolish a whole multi-story building for encroaching a
few inches is clearly not so easy to rationalize. The point, as far as the extent
or signiﬁcance of the encroachment is concerned, is that it is more likely that
small encroachments will cause the affected landowner little or no harm, in
which case it is easier to justify replacing a demolition order with a
compensation award if demolition would cause great loss for the encroacher.
The result in Bothma can also be explained with reference to the principle
that the affected owner cannot insist on demolition if she either acquiesced in
the encroachment, or if it had existed for such a long time that prescription
61 The Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 prescribes formalities with regard to regis-
tration of real rights in land. Except for a few well-established instances where rights
vest originally by operation of law, ownership in land cannot be acquired in the
absence of registration. I am indebted to Gerrit Pienaar for assisting me in setting out
these principles accurately.
62 For example acquisitive prescription, where the change in ownership is autho-
rized and governed by the PrescriptionAct 18 of 1943 and the PrescriptionAct 68 of
1969. Section 33 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 prescribes the procedure for
aligning the register with the change in ownership.
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or estoppel precludes demolition.63 The encroachment in that case had been
in existence for such a long time that it would have been necessary for the
affected landowner — a state body not using the bulk of its land for any
purpose — to establish very good proof of the loss or harm caused to it by the
encroachment. The Water Board could not do so and accordingly the
encroacher was not even required to pay compensation.
In Brian Lackey Trust64 the decision not to allow demolition could have
been justiﬁed with reference to the principle that a landowner would be
precluded from insisting upon demolition if her actions were inspired purely
by malice or bad faith. It is not clear that the landowner was acting in bad
faith in Brian Lackey Trust, but tradition offers an explanation for a judicial
discretion to award damages in lieu of demolition based on the malicious
intent or bad faith of the affected landowner, or on the extreme injustice of
ordering demolition where compensation would have met the case
adequately.
From these considerations it is possible to suggest a tentative formulation
of the guiding principle (often explained in the case law as being a
reasonableness principle) that seems to inspire the courts in exercising their
discretion to grant compensation rather than a demolition order in certain
encroachment cases, even when the result is that the innocent landowner
thereby loses her land involuntarily. The principle seems to be that the courts
would normally grant a demolition order to the affected owner, except if the
affected landowner’s action or inaction indicates that she acquiesced in the
encroachment. This would apply particularly when the encroachment is
insigniﬁcant and when demolition would also bring about minimal loss.
However, if demolition would cause far greater or more serious harm to the
encroacher than the affected owner would suffer if the demolition order
were not to be granted, the courts are willing to consider replacing the
demolition order with a compensation award.Again, this possibility could be
excluded if the encroacher acted in bad faith. In cases where a compensation
order appears to offer a better solution, the courts seem to ask themselves
whether a compensation order would meet the case adequately — if so, the
encroachment can be left in place and the encroaching neighbour can be
ordered to pay compensation to the affected landowner. In such a case, the
normal operation of attachment principles is apparently suspended and the
encroaching building does not attach to the neighbour’s land. The
compensation award is intended to compensate the affected landowner for
the loss of use of her land because of the continuous encroachment.
63 See Cilliers & Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 587–93. In Bothma the court
decided that the so-called year-and-day rule that created a prescription-like excep-
tion originated in local custom and no longer applied in South African law (at 130A-
E). It is possible to argue that a long delay in bringing the application indicates either
acquiescence or lack of detriment on the side of the applicant — the court suggests
that this is an important consideration in coming to the conclusion (at 139).
64 And evenmore in the case of Lombard v Fischer supra note 1.
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In principle, an order for compensation in lieu of demolition should be
regarded as an exceptional remedy, to be used only when the circumstances
justify it. This might appear to indicate that the compensation award is better
suited for instances where a small encroachment cannot be demolished, but
the courts do seem willing to grant such an order even if the encroachment is
signiﬁcant, with the effect that the affected landowner is effectively deprived
of all use of her own land.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Modern Dutch and German private law both follow roughly the same
approach that is offered by Pope as the best explanation of Roman-Dutch
law, namely that the normal principles of attachment are suspended so that
the encroaching building extends over, but does not attach to the
neighbour’s land. The respective civil codes provide for consequences that
suit that construction.
Dutch law
The point of departure in Dutch private law is that a landowner is entitled to
exclusive possession and use of her land and of the space above and
underneath the surface of her land. Accordingly, the landowner can claim
removal of building works that extend on, under or over her land. However,
the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) has decided that the affected
landowner is not permitted to abuse her right by insisting upon removal of
encroachments under circumstances where the encroachment hardly limits
the affected landowner’s use and enjoyment of her land, whereas removal
would bring about great loss or harm for the encroacher.65 To provide for
those cases, art 5:54 of the Dutch civil code (BW: Burgerlijk Wetboek)
determines that if a building or construction is erected partly or completely
upon or under the land of another person, and if the owner of the building or
works would suffer greater loss from demolition or removal than the
landowner would suffer if it were left intact, the owner of the building or
works can claim, against suitable compensation, that a real servitude should
be created in his favour to maintain the status quo or, if the owner of the land
prefers, that the relevant part of her land be transferred to the owner of the
building or works. This provision does not apply if the builder had a right to
build or if he was malicious or grossly negligent.
Article 5:54 BW is written from the perspective of the encroacher. The
point of departure is that the landowner can claim removal, but where
removal of the encroachment would bring about greater loss for the
encroacher than would be suffered by the landowner if the encroachment
were left intact, the encroacher can demand that the encroachment be left
65 WH M Reehuis &AHTHeisterkamp Pitlo Het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 3
Goederenrecht 12 ed (2006) 446; see further the decision of the Hooge Raad: HR 17
April 1970, NJ 1971, 89.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL608
intact against payment of compensation. The legal construction of the
respective rights affected by the surviving encroachment is left to the choice
of the landowner: normally, a real servitude will be created over the affected
landowner’s land in favour of the encroacher, but the affected landowner has
the option to choose that the relevant piece of land should be transferred to
the encroacher against payment of compensation.
The Dutch courts read art 5:54 BW in combination with art 3:13 BW
(which prohibits abuse of the owner’s right) and they read them in such a
way that either or both provisions could be applied to the same effect.66
However, it should be noted that the Dutch courts’ reading of article 5:54
BW in the context of abuse of right is more readily justiﬁed than the similar
construction in Brian Lackey Trust, because in the Dutch cases this
interpretation is restricted to instances where the encroachment does not
bring about any signiﬁcant restriction for the affected landowner — to insist
on demolition in such a case could indeed bring the doctrine of abuse of right
into consideration. In regard to Brian Lackey Trust it could be argued that the
balance of loss and harm favoured the encroacher, but it could not be said
that the encroachment did not bring about any signiﬁcant harm or loss for
the affected landowner — he effectively lost all use of his land.
German law
The point of departure in German private law is also that the owner of land
can demand the removal of encroaching building works that interfere with
the use and enjoyment of her land, among other things because of the rule of
attachment. The German civil code (BGB: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)
therefore provides for demolition as the default remedy (§§ 93, 94, 946 and
1004 BGB). However, this solution could bring about unwanted conse-
quences, especially if it is abused by the affected landowner to acquire unfair
beneﬁts from the situation.67 Accordingly, if the encroacher has built across
the boundary line onto the land of a neighbour without malice or gross
negligence and, unless the affected landowner immediately objected to the
encroachment, the affected landowner must accept the existence of the
encroachment, against annual payment of a compensatory amount in the
nature of a rent or annuity (§§ 912–913 BGB). The amount of compensation
is calculated according to the provisions of the civil code and the right to
receive the compensation overrides all other rights in the land. Although it is
preferable that the right to receive compensation be entered in the land
register, this does not happen automatically (§ 914 BGB).
The affected landowner can at any time demand that the encroacher
should buy the affected piece of land from her against a price that reﬂects its
value when the encroachment ﬁrst occurred (§ 915 BGB), whereafter the
66 See generally Reehuis & Heisterkamp op cit note 65; see further the decision
of the Hoge Raad: HR 15 November 2002 para 3.7.2 (available at http://
www.rechstpraak.nl, last accessed on 3March 2008).
67 See Fritz Baur, Jurgen F Baur &Rolf Stürner Sachenrecht 17 ed (1999) 278.
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rights and liabilities of the parties are determined by the provisions of the sale.
German law therefore normally allows the encroachment to stand, regardless
of the balance of loss or inconvenience, and also grants the owner of the
affected land a choice to demand that the affected land be transferred to the
encroacher. Judging from the provisions regarding the payment of compen-
sation, a limited real right is not initially created in favour of the encroacher,
but in favour of the affected landowner, with reference to her right to receive
compensation. From the literature it appears as if the accepted construction is
that attachment of the encroachment is suspended, so that the encroacher
remains owner of the building that encroaches upon the land that belongs to
the neighbour.68 Like Dutch law, §§ 912–915 BGB do not apply if the
encroacher acted with malice or gross negligence or if the affected
landowner immediately objected to the encroachment.
English law
In English law the erection of an unlicensed building or structure upon
neighbouring land constitutes a continuing trespass, for which the courts
could award either injunctive relief or damages.69 Although it is sometimes
said that injunctive relief is, or should be, a prima facie right because a
landowner whose title is not in issue is entitled to an injunction to restrain
trespass on her land whether she is harmed by it or not,70 Gray & Gray argue
that ‘it is increasingly apparent that the remedy of injunction is no longer an
automatic or necessary judicial response to trespass’ and state that ‘the courts
increasingly exercise a power to license, on payment of compensation, a
broadly acceptable compromise of conﬂicting interests’.71 This tendency is
explained with reference to what are described as ‘modern imperatives of
social accommodation and of ‘‘reasonableness between neighbours’’ ’,
supported by the contemporary equivalent of the Lord Cairns’s Act,72 which
allows the courts to withhold injunctive relief in favour of an award of
equitable damages in respect of future or continuing acts of trespass.73 These
changing circumstances support the shift of emphasis in English law from
injunctive to compensatory relief in trespass cases, despite the fact that
damages is an inadequate form of relief for future and continuing acts of
trespass, which encroachment inevitably is.
68 Ibid at 279, citing § 95 BGB and the decision of the Civil Supreme Court in
BGHNJW1985, 789.
69 Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray Elements of Land Law 4 ed (2005) 247–52. See
further, on Australian and New Zealand law, P O’Connor ‘An adjudication rule for
encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a building encroachment statute?’ in
Elizabeth Cooke (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law IV (2007) 197–217; idem ‘The
private taking of land: Adverse possession, encroachment by buildings and improve-
ment bymistake’ (2006) 33 University of Western Australia LR 31.
70 Gray &Gray op cit note 69 at 248, citing English and Irish case law.
71 Ibid.
72 Section 50 of the SupremeCourtAct 1981 (UK).
73 Gray &Gray op cit note 69 at 248.
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In Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co74 the court emphasized that
landowners, especially those who are certain of their title, have a prima facie
right to injunctive relief, but the court also formulated the ‘good working
rule’ (later relied upon by South African courts), according to which courts
should exercise their discretion in choosing between injunctive relief and
compensation on the basis of equity, taking into account factors such as the
scope of the injury caused to the landowner’s rights, whether the injury can
be estimated in money and be compensated adequately by payment of a sum
of money, and also whether it would be oppressive to the defendant if an
injunction were to be granted. In Jaggard v Sawyer75 the Court of Appeal
emphasized that encroachers cannot expect, on the one hand, to have an
unlawful continuing trespass committed by them further continued simply
because they could and were willing to pay for it; but also that, on the other
hand, a landowner subjected to a continuing trespass cannot expect
automatically to be able to have the building demolished simply because she
wanted undisturbed possession. In some cases the encroachment might just
have to be accepted by the affected landowner as a fait accompli, particularly
when the encroaching buildings are houses now occupied by people and
families — and then compensation might be a better solution.
Gray & Gray argue, on the basis of case law, that monetary relief is often
preferred to injunctive relief when the encroachment has had no more than a
slight impact on the affected landowner; where compensation is easy to
calculate; where the claimant has delayed in seeking injunctive relief; or
where the affected landowner unreasonably demands excessive compensa-
tion or refuses to consider reasonable compensation offers.76 Injunctive relief
is indicated for cases of especially ﬂagrant or repeated trespass or permanent
and continuing annexation of land; where the interference is signiﬁcant and
not easily compensable in money; or where the complainant would
otherwise be subjected to an oppressive compulsory purchase of her land by
the trespasser.77 A preference for monetary compensation instead of
injunctive relief could imply that the courts are authorizing the continuation
of an unlawful state of affairs or that they allow the trespasser to purchase
74 Supra note 26. See further Jaggard v Sawyer supra note 26. In US law, the ten-
dency is either to force transfer of the land to the encroacher or to allow the land-
owner to buy the improvement — in both cases against market price. Most states
have legislation that will allow either option. In most cases, relief will be denied
altogether if the encroachment is minor, and injunctive relief (demolition) will always
be granted if the encroacher acted in bad faith. Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of
Law 6 ed (2003) 54–5 argues that the latter rule is efﬁcient. In some cases the US
courts grant injunctive relief if the encroachment was signiﬁcant, depending on how
the courts construe the balance between competing interests; see Amkco Ltd Co v
Welborn 21 P 3d 24 (2001). I am indebted to Gregory Alexander for information on
US law.
75 Jaggard v Sawyer supra note 26 at 280 and 282.
76 Gray &Gray op cit note 69 at 250.
77 Ibid at 250–1.
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immunity for his unlawful actions, but the English courts have accepted that
they sometimes are forced to follow this route to avoid granting injunctive
relief that would deliver the trespasser ‘bound hand and foot’ to the claimant,
exposing him to extortionate compensation demands.78
Despite the attractions of the obvious similarities, South African analysts
should be careful not to embrace English law on trespass too easily — the
developments in South African case law described earlier resulted from
uncritical borrowing from English law. There are differences between the
two systems that render comparison — and creative borrowing — a
dangerous undertaking. The ﬁrst difference is that the links between
nuisance and trespass in English law are not the same as those between
nuisance and encroachment in SouthAfrican law — hence the apparent ease
with which reasonableness logic can be applied in English trespass cases,
whereas the same cannot be said for South African encroachment law. The
second difference is that trespass is a much wider concept in English law than
encroachment in South African law. For one thing, trespass relates to any
unlicensed entry upon land and therefore extends to physical presence of
persons on land, while encroachment does not. Thirdly, although there are
certain similarities between English and South African law as far as moving
away from an absolutist notion of ownership is concerned,79 any comparison
between the English notion of trespass by building and the SouthAfrican law
of encroachment by building is complicated by the notion of relative title in
English law, since access to remedies in trespass and in nuisance traditionally
rests upon possession rather than title in English law and,80 more pertinently,
multiple ‘overlaying’ estates can be created with regard to the same land in
English law.81 The pressure to ﬁnd a doctrinally acceptable solution without
dividing the property into horizontal slices is therefore much stronger in
South African law, whereas English law is more receptive to the idea that
multiple property interests can exist simultaneously with regard to horizontal
layers of the land and the airspace above it. Finally, the English distinction
between common law and equity obviously does not apply in South African
law and, given the prominent role of the Lord Cairns’s Act in extending the
possibilities of granting compensation in lieu of injunctive relief, compara-
tive analysis is inevitably complicated.
Evaluation
Comparatively speaking, English law looks like a somewhat more developed
version of the position that is apparently being explored in the recent South
African cases, but at the same time the solutions adopted in English law do
not necessarily ﬁt comfortably into South African law because of the
78 Ibid at 252.
79 Ibid at 226 and 238–9.
80 Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 CLJ 252 at 257n27.
81 Ibid at 258. Something similar is possible in South African law only in the
context of the Sectional TitlesAct 95 of 1986.
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institutional differences between the two systems mentioned directly above.
Nevertheless, in cases where compensation was ordered in lieu of demolition
— and probably cases in which transfer of the land was ordered — the South
African courts relied on the justiﬁcatory reasoning and the tests developed
for this purpose in English law. The test laid down in Shelfer seems to have
played a particularly prominent role. The most striking feature of the English
example followed by the South African courts is the absence of concern, in
English law, about the exact structuring of rights in the affected land, once a
compensation order has been given. As we have seen, the creation of
multiple rights in the same land is not problematic in English land law, but in
South African law this creates a problem because of the abstract nature of
ownership. The early South African decisions in which transfer of the
affected land was ordered together with the compensation award were
possibly inspired by the need to account for this problem.
Modern German and Dutch law both proclaim an outright preference for
replacing the property option of a demolition order with a compensation
order, at least when the encroaching party was not acting in bad faith or
grossly negligently and (in Dutch law) when the affected landowner did not
complain immediately — and provided that the balance of loss or
inconvenience favours the encroaching party. German law opts for the
simplest solution by creating a preferent right, in favour of the affected
landowner, to receive compensation in all cases of encroachment, regardless
of the balance of loss. Demolition therefore does not feature as an option at
all. In both German and Dutch law provision is explicitly made for
formalization of the resulting land rights of the respective parties by
establishing a special kind of servitude or a rent in favour of the encroacher,
complemented by the option — given to the affected landowner — to
demand transfer of the affected land against payment of a fair price. Neither
system seems to be unduly concerned about the fact that the affected
innocent landowner is effectively forced into involuntary sale of her land in
the process; and both formalize the procedure for establishing a fair price in
legislation.
Perhaps the most interesting result of the comparative analysis is the fact
that in all four systems the same considerations inspire the search for
alternative solutions and the choice of conditions under which a particular
alternative would be considered acceptable. First, an owner affected by
encroachment is generally deprived of his right to insist on demolition if he
acquiesced in the situation (or seemed to acquiesce, through long-standing
failure to act), if he is affected only very slightly by the encroachment, or if he
insists upon demolition simply to create a holdout situation that will bring
him extortionate compensation. Secondly, an encroacher will be deprived of
the opportunity to retain possession of the encroachment against payment of
compensation if he acted in bad faith or with gross negligence. Thirdly, the
choice in favour of compensatory rather than injunctive relief follows either
in all instances without any differentiation (German law), or in all cases
where the encroacher would suffer much greater loss from enforcement of
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demolition than the landowner would if it were not enforced (Dutch law);
or if enforcing the demolition order would cause unjustiﬁable oppression for
the encroacher, whereas replacement of injunctive relief with compensation
would not cause unjustiﬁable oppression for the landowner (English law).
South African law seems to follow a route somewhere inbetween English
and Dutch law. Neither German nor Dutch law pays any attention to the size
or scope of the encroachment; both English and SouthAfrican law profess to
reserve the compensation alternative for exceptional cases where the
encroachment and the impact of the affected landowner are small, but both
seem to extend the practical application of the replacement remedy beyond
that point.
The most signiﬁcant difference between the various systems is that Dutch
and German law formalize the respective land rights of the affected
landowner and the encroacher, whereas English law does not consider that a
problem. South African law follows the English example but does consider
the structuring of the respective rights to be problematic and therefore opts
for a further judicial discretion, allowing the courts to order transfer of the
land to the encroacher where it is practicable. This solution reﬂects the
comparable choice in Dutch and German law, except for the fact that the
forced transfer is provided for by legislation in those systems, whereas it is
apparently (and unconvincingly) left to judicial discretion in South African
law.
LAW-AND-ECONOMICS ANALYSIS
The terminological and conceptual distinction between ‘property rules’ and
‘liability rules’ was developed in law-and-economics analyses of pollution
disputes.82 The famous and inﬂuential article in which the choice between
property rules and liability rules was originally set out, generally known as
Calabresi and Melamed’s ‘Cathedral article’,83 was written in response to
82 Joseph William Singer Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 131–9
explains that the rights-as-relationships discourse, of which the discourse about
property rules and liability rules forms part, originated in Hohfeld’s analysis of jural
relations (see the works by Hohfeld in note 9 above); and that it combined with the
literature on the Coase Theorem: Ronald H Coase ‘The problem of social cost’
(1960) 3 J of Law & Economics 1 argued that when transaction costs are absent or
minimal, Pareto optimality (or economic efﬁciency, where the allocation of resources
cannot be improved in such a way that those who beneﬁt from the change can
compensate those who suffer from it and still be better off) will occur regardless of the
initial entitlement assigned. In the distinction between property rules and liability
rules, the Coase Theorem implies that when transaction costs are low or absent,
economic efﬁciency will follow regardless of where the original entitlement is placed
(encroacher or affected landowner) and of whether a property rule or a liability rule is
followed. See further Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen Law and Economics 4 ed (2004)
85–91.
83 Calabresi & Melamed op cit note 9. On the inﬂuence of this article see James E
Krier & Stewart J Schwab ‘The cathedral at twenty-ﬁve: Citations and impressions’
(1997) 106 Yale LJ 2121.
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Michelman’s84 view, in his review of Calabresi’s book on accidents law,85
that Calabresi’s argument about economic analysis of accidents law can
fruitfully be applied to pollution disputes. Michelman showed that this
argument, when applied to pollution cases, would involve a choice between
three rules, all of which presuppose a dispute between a polluter, P, and an
affected resident, R. The three rules were: (1) the court ﬁnds a nuisance and
grants injunctive relief against P in favour of R (if P wants to continue
polluting he must bargain with R); (2) the court ﬁnds a nuisance but allows P
to continue polluting against payment of judicially determined compensa-
tion to R (P has to decide whether to continue polluting and pay
compensation or abate); (3) the court ﬁnds no nuisance and allows P to
continue polluting without payment to R (to terminate the pollution, R
would have to buy P out). The ﬁrst and third rules can induce voluntary and
bilateral post-judgment transactions between P and R, while the second rule
establishes a unilateral and involuntary ‘sale’ of R’s entitlement, against a
‘price’ imposed by the court, that P can enforce against R if he so chooses,
but without the option of further negotiation with R about the price.
In their subsequent article, Calabresi and Melamed argued that Michel-
man failed to formulate a fourth rule: (4) the court ﬁnds a nuisance and grants
R injunctive relief to force P to abate, against R paying compensation to P as
determined by the court. This is a further unilateral, involuntary transaction;
R can decide to endure the pollution or to enforce abatement by paying
compensation, which amounts to ‘buying P out’. Calabresi and Melamed
concluded that there are two solutions that allow the parties to either go with
the court order or to enter into voluntary, bilateral post-judgment
transactions to amend it, as well as two solutions that enforce a unilateral,
judicially imposed buy-out that one party can either enforce against the
other party, against a judicially pre-determined price, or decide not to
enforce. Calabresi and Melamed described the ﬁrst set of two solutions as
applications of property rules and the last set of two as applications of liability
rules.
In the terminology of Calabresi and Melamed, property rules protect
entitlements (property rights) that are transferred, if at all, through voluntary
transactions in a market.86 Rules 1 and 3 are examples of property rules:
either R gets injunctive relief to stop the pollution (but the parties can
negotiate a different outcome, for example, P buys the right to pollute from
R); or R gets no relief and P can continue to pollute (but the parties can
84 Michelman op cit note 9.
85 Calabresi op cit note 9.
86 Calabresi & Melamed op cit note 9 at 1092: ‘An entitlement is protected by a
property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from
its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It is the form of entitlement which gives rise
to the least amount of state intervention: once the original entitlement is agreed
upon, the state does not try to decide its value.’
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negotiate a different outcome, for example, R buys P out to ensure
abatement). Liability rules can reach substantially the same outcomes, but in
these cases the holder of the entitlement is obliged either to go with the court
order or sell in a unilateral, involuntary transaction, without negotiation,
against a price predetermined by the court.87 Rules 2 and 4 are examples of
liability rules: either P forces R to sell its entitlement not to suffer from
pollution (P decides to continue polluting and pay compensation); or R
forces P to sell its entitlement to pollute (R decides to enforce abatement and
pay compensation).
Twenty-three years after publication of the original Cathedral article,
Krier & Schwab88 argued that the mainstream reading of the Cathedral
analysis developed into a ‘virtual dogma’ that implies a choice for property
rules when transaction costs are low and for liability rules when transaction
costs are high. The transaction costs associated with this choice are usefully
divided into Type-I transaction costs (pre-negotiations difﬁculties involved
in identifying and assembling numerous interested parties) and Type-II
transaction costs (difﬁculties created during the negotiations stage by parties
who display strategic behaviour to extract maximum beneﬁt).89 Since the
general assumption is that both Type-I transaction costs (when there are
multiple affected owners) and Type-II transaction costs are usually high in
pollution cases, the assumption has taken root that nuisance cases of the
pollution variety are typically best solved by way of liability rules, in other
words by damages awards.
Type-I transaction costs typically play little if any role in encroachment
disputes, which normally involve just one encroacher and one affected
owner, but as appears from the two recent South African cases set out above,
Type-II transaction costs (strategic behaviour) are central to these disputes
because the landowner who is affected by encroachment could create a
holdout situation to extract extortionate compensation. Similarly, a wealthy
and determined encroacher can practically buy the right to bring about a
forced sale by encroaching on land that is not for sale in the market. The
higher the costs of the encroachment and the larger the scope of the
encroachment, the higher the stakes and consequently the risk of strategic
behaviour will be, if any party is given the opportunity. Based on these
somewhat oversimpliﬁed observations, one might be tempted to conclude
that, in law-and-economics terms, the potentially high risk of strategic
87 Ibid: ‘Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to
pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability
rule’, and ‘[o]bviously, liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention:
not only are entitlements protected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the
basis of a value determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties
themselves’, which precludes private bargaining.
88 James E Krier & Stewart J Schwab ‘Property rules and liability rules: The cathe-
dral in another light’ (1995) 70 Northwestern University LR 440.
89 The distinction is explained by Carol M Rose ‘The shadow of the cathedral’
(1997) 106 Yale LJ 2175 at 2184.
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behaviour would always raise Type-II transaction costs in encroachment
disputes, at least when the encroachment is signiﬁcant, to such a level that
liability rules would always be preferable to property rules in solving these
disputes. In view of these conclusions, one might be tempted to deduce that
injunctive relief, in other words demolition of encroaching building works,
is only an option in respect of encroachments of insigniﬁcant scope or
impact. However, later publications have diminished the force of the
mainstream law-and-economics argument in favour of liability rules.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant counter-argument was raised by Polinsky,90 who
argued that the dogma that favours liability rules when transactions costs are
high is incoherent in the context of real-world assumptions, which are
signiﬁcantly different from the assumptions on which the mainstream
‘dogmatic position’ in favour of liability rules was developed. Krier &
Schwab, following Polinsky, argued that the true extent of the damage
caused by pollution is often uncertain (high assessment costs)91 and,
moreover, that high assessment costs are often linked to high transaction
costs. Accordingly, when private bargaining is impeded by high transaction
costs, judicial damages awards are sometimes rendered inaccurate or even
speculative because of similar or related reasons, with the result that there is
no a priori basis for favouring liability rules over property rules. Krier &
Schwab argued that a combination of high transaction costs and high
assessment costs often reﬂects real-world conditions more accurately than the
low-assessment-cost assumption of mainstream post-Cathedral literature,92
and that that undermines the seemingly self-evident mainstream preference
for liability rules over property rules in complex pollution cases. As far as
encroachment disputes are concerned, transaction costs are usually restricted
to the results of strategic behaviour by the affected landowner, which might
suggest that it could be more efﬁcient to employ a liability rule (along the
lines of Michelman’s rule 2) to allow the encroacher — who might in these
circumstances be what Krier & Schwab describe as the ‘best [in the sense of
more rational] chooser’93 — to make the choice between payment and
90 A Mitchell Polinsky ‘Resolving nuisance disputes: The simple economics of
injunctive and damage remedies’ (1980) 32 Stanford LR 1075; ‘Controlling externali-
ties and protecting entitlements: Property right, liability rules, and tax-subsidy
approaches’ (1979) 8 J of Legal Studies 1; ‘On the choice between property rules and
liability rules’ (1980) 18 Economic Inquiry 233.
91 See generally Krier & Schwab op cit note 88.
92 In response, Krier & Schwab developed the ‘reverse-reverse’ or ‘double reverse
twist’ version of the fourth rule, based on the principle of ‘the best chooser’, so that
the party who can best choose between payment or deferral (usually a single party
rather than many) should be given the choice. That could overturn rule 4, so that P
gets the choice to pay or abate in the fourth instance set out in the Cathedral article,
rather than granting the liability remedy to R (who, on real world assumptions, is
very likely to be multiple people rather than a single person and therefore a ‘bad
chooser’). See Krier & Schwab op cit note 88 at 459–64. This does not apply in
encroachment disputes, where there is typically just one affected landowner.
93 Ibid.
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abatement. However, a more or less mechanical preference for liability rules
in these cases runs the risk of losing sight of the reason why we do not simply
replace all property rules with liability rules. Calabresi and Melamed
formulated one part of the answer to that question clearly and convincingly:
‘The answer is, of course, obvious. Liability rules represent only an approxima-
tion of the value of the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such
an approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the thief than to
the owner.’94
Holding on to a systematic preference for liability rules simply because
transaction costs are high (in this case because of the risk of strategic
behaviour by the owner) would allow the encroacher always to make the
choice between abatement and payment, on the basis of a price determined
by the court, while excluding any possibility of the parties negotiating a
different outcome on the basis of the affected owner’s preferences. If the
uncertainty of damage assessment (high assessment costs) is taken into
consideration, this option does not provide such a clear preference for
liability rules as one would like to think. At least in some cases, a property
rule (granting the affected owner a demolition order) would allow the parties
to negotiate a different outcome that could be more efﬁcient and more
equitable than one which relies on judicial evaluation of unclear assessment
factors.
Proceeding from these premises, one might attempt to reformulate the
different options presented by the four rules (the original three formulated by
Michelman and the fourth added by Calabresi and Melamed) for solving an
encroachment problem as follows:
According to the ﬁrst rule, the court would ﬁnd that there is an
encroachment and protect the affected landowner’s entitlement with a
property rule; in other words, she receives injunctive relief to the effect that
the encroachment must be removed. This leaves the option open for the
owner and the encroacher to negotiate an alternative outcome, mostly in the
form of an agreement about a price against which the affected owner would
be willing to sell her right to demolish. This is exactly the case in which it is
feared that rational negotiations would be prevented by strategic acting on
the affected landowner’s part. It is said that such an order delivers the
encroacher ‘bound hand and foot’ to the owner because the owner can make
any price she fancies, given the sword of demolition over the encroacher’s
head. The Brian Lackey Trust case illustrates the point well. In terms of
economic analysis it could perhaps be said that there is nothing wrong with
the affected owner holding out for the highest possible compensation,
because the encroacher will always have the option of abating (demolition) if
the price goes too high. Interestingly, in both Roman-Dutch and in English
law this ﬁrst option is said to be the default position, but it seems to be
followed less often than one would expect. In fact, this option only seems
94 Calabresi &Melamed op cit note 9 at 1125.
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convincing if the encroachment is of little use or value to the encroacher,
cheap to demolish or to remove, and, if not abated, would be oppressive for
the affected landowner. The crucial fact is that the affected landowner is
given the primary choice, while the encroacher retains the option of pulling
out and cutting his losses if the stakes are raised too high.
If the second rule is followed, the court ﬁnds that there is an
encroachment, but it elects to apply a liability rule: the encroaching party
remains in possession of the building and must pay compensation to the
landowner according to a calculation done by the court itself. In this case the
encroaching party retains some choice; he can either remain in possession of
the building works and pay the prescribed compensation or he can decide to
abate the encroachment, if that is cheaper or easier. This seems to have
become the de facto working rule for most signiﬁcant encroachments in
English and South African law, at least in cases where demolition or removal
of the encroachment would pose a signiﬁcant threat or loss for the
encroacher and if the landowner’s loss can be quantiﬁed reasonably easily.
This solution enjoys wide support where the threat of demolition creates a
holdout situation in which the affected landowner can strategically attempt
to extract extortionate compensation. The crucial fact is that the encroacher
is given the choice and that the affected landowner is not given an option to
negotiate a different outcome because the price is set down by the court. In
German law this is the ofﬁcial default rule; in Dutch law it only comes into
operation if the encroacher would suffer more from injunctive relief than the
owner would from having to accept compensation. (In Dutch and German
law the calculation of compensation is regulated by the civil code.)
However, signiﬁcantly, in both Dutch and German law the landowner is
given the choice whether to enforce a buyout by the encroacher.
If the court decides in favour of the third rule, it will ﬁnd that there is no
encroachment and therefore no compensation. This solution can only work
in encroachment cases if the encroachment is either illusory or really
insigniﬁcant. Being a solution based on a property rule, the parties are left
with the choice to negotiate a different outcome, which would mostly
involve the owner buying out the encroacher: if the affected owner really
wants to get rid of an insigniﬁcant encroachment she will have to negotiate a
price with the encroaching party.
Calabresi and Melamed’s proposed fourth rule means that the court allows
the encroaching party to continue encroaching, but protects that entitlement
only by a liability rule (adapted from their pollution example),95 which, gives
the affected landowner the option of demolishing the encroachment and
paying damages for it. In this case it is the landowner who has the choice to
act or not to act, according to her judgement on whether it is worth the
prescribed amount of damages. This option does not seem to have enjoyed
serious attention in the case law yet, but it could offer an equitable outcome
95 Ibid at 1123.
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in cases where the owner attaches a higher personal value to unencumbered
use of the land than the value that the encroacher attaches to not demolishing
the encroachment.
Of the four possibilities, the tendency in South African case law seems to
be a move from a preference for the ﬁrst to a preference for the second rule,
in other words from a simple property-based demolition order to a
court-imposed compensation remedy; ie a move away from a property and
towards a liability rule. The tendency in English, Dutch and German law is
similar, although the Dutch and German civil codes allow the landowner to
enforce a buyout of the affected land. Are lawyers therefore, perhaps
instinctively, following the dictates of economic efﬁciency in moving away
from property rules and towards liability rules in solving encroachment
disputes?
Within the ranks of lawyers who make use of law-and-economics analysis,
Carol Rose96 formulated a strong argument against the general tendency to
prefer liability rules over property rules, at least in pollution cases. Rose
emphasizes that property rules are supposed to encourage individual
investment, planning and effort, which in property disputes tends to
counteract or reduce the threat of transaction costs (both in the pre-
bargaining sense of identifying and assembling multiple parties and in the
sense of post-bargaining strategic behaviour). Based on the pollution cases
discussed in the Cathedral literature, Rose argues that courts often fall back
on liability rules, not because they are inherently or strategically superior, but
because using a liability rule allows the courts to make a relatively accurate
assessment of damages and to allow the polluter to choose whether to pay or
abate.97 Far from illustrating economic efﬁciency in instances where
transaction costs between the parties are high, this preference illustrates
judicial strategic behaviour in cases where the assessment costs are high. In
Rose’s view, the most convincing examples and arguments supporting a
preference for liability rules in instances with high transaction costs are really
to be found only in contract or accident cases; and the preference for liability
rules in property cases with high transaction costs, based on the logic of the
Cathedral article, is not stable. Rose therefore argues that there are solid
reasons for retaining at least some property rules that protect individual
investment, planning and effort in property. Although there is a generally
acknowledged high risk of strategic behaviour in encroachment holdouts,
the advantage to be gained from such behaviour is not necessarily the only
reason why landowners affected by encroachment are unwilling to sell or
lose (ownership or use of) their land.
There are several possible ways out of the impasse created by the risk of
strategic behaviour. One is to follow the rule established in English case law,
96 See generally Rose op cit note 89.
97 Rose argues that this only works if one keeps in mind that pollution is not the
same as accidents in the sense that the pollution damage rises proportionately and also
that there are usually many Ps andmanyRs involved in a pollution case.
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namely that the affected landowner loses her right to injunctive relief if the
court thinks that she is simply acting strategically — and in that case, a
liability rule is followed. Economic analysis suggests that this option is not
efﬁcient, since it interferes with strategic behaviour that could arguably be
corrected by the market itself, if negotiation between the parties is allowed to
take its course. Another option is to explore the fourth rule developed by
Calabresi and Melamed, according to which the affected landowner is given
the option either to endure the encroachment against payment of compensa-
tion or to buy out the encroacher. Buying out the encroacher when the
continued existence of the encroachment is already subjected to compensa-
tion payment might seem strange, but there is no reason in principle why the
owner cannot be given the option to make good the difference between the
compensation that the encroacher must pay in any event and the value of the
encroachment for the encroacher and for the landowner. In cases where the
landowner for some reason attaches a higher personal value to continued
unencumbered use of the land, giving her the choice might be fair. A third
option is the one suggested by the German and Dutch civil codes, which
solve the problem with two hands by establishing (i) a real right to protect
the interests of the encroacher (in Dutch law only when the encroacher will
lose more from injunctive relief than the affected owner will from being
reduced to receiving compensation), but (ii) also giving the affected innocent
landowner the option to enforce a sale of the affected land at a legislatively
regulated price. At the moment South African law seems to follow English
law, which suggests a preference for the ﬁrst option, but at the same time
South African law seemingly wants to employ the transfer aspect of Dutch
and German law as well, albeit without the necessary statutory authority.
Following either the third or the second option (or a combination of the
two) in South African law would require legislation.
A further aspect that deserves consideration in view of the economic
analysis is transfer of the land to the encroacher. Several aspects should be
mentioned. First, if the courts have the power to order transfer of the land to
the encroacher when granting a compensation award, as some SouthAfrican
cases indicate, it is of course also possible that the encroacher could act
strategically by forcing a sale of land that is not for sale in the market.
Preventing such strategic behaviour is clearly the reason for the rule,
formulated in English law and followed in South African law, that an
encroacher cannot expect to get away with paying compensation for the
encroachment if he acted in bad faith. A similar rule operates in Dutch and
German law (and in US law), indicating that the preference for a liability rule
falls away as soon as it appears that the encroachment was built in bad faith to
enforce transfer of the land. Secondly, if the courts are given the power to
order transfer of the land together with granting a monetary award of
compensation, the preference for a liability rule is exacerbated in the sense
that not only an intrusion is involuntarily imposed on the landowner — for
which compensation could well be an acceptable remedy — but a forced sale
of her land. The implications of this choice are obviously much wider than
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just the choice in favour of compensation instead of demolition. By giving
the choice to transfer ownership of the land to the landowner, Dutch and
German law avoids these implications to a certain extent, in the sense that the
owner in those systems is given the choice to accept compensation for
involuntary loss of a real right or for involuntary loss of the land as such.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
It has been pointed out that the unilateral and involuntary loss of property
resulting from encroachment disputes governed by a liability rule could
result in an arbitrary deprivation, or perhaps even an expropriation, that
needs to be justiﬁed in terms of the property guarantee in s 25 of the
Constitution.98 If the owner’s loss is seen as a deprivation, the relevant
requirement in s 25(1) is that the deprivation may not be arbitrary;99 if it is
seen as an expropriation, s 25(2) requires that the expropriation should be for
a public purpose and that just and equitable compensation has to be paid
according to s 25(3).
Two kinds of loss resulting from encroachment should be distinguished. If
the court decides not to grant a demolition order and instead to grant
compensation while allowing the encroacher continued possession of the
building works, the most likely dogmatic explanation is that the rules of
attachment are suspended, so that the building intrudes into, but does not
attach to, the affected landowner’s land. What the landowner loses then,
involuntarily, is something in the nature of a limited real right such as a
servitude that reduces her unencumbered use and enjoyment of her land.
The compensation should make good that loss, taking into account that the
loss is involuntary. Imposition of similar burdens is not unknown in South
African law and in most cases explaining it in terms of s 25(1) would be
relatively unproblematic. However, if the court also orders — as some older
cases suggest that it could — that the land should be transferred to the
encroacher, the affected landowner loses ownership of the affected land. In
this case it is said that the amount of compensation should also make good
that loss, once again considering that the loss was involuntary. However, the
forced transfer that takes place in these cases is much more serious and
accordingly more problematic in terms of s 25.
Generally, loss of property by operation of the rules of the common law
cannot be treated as expropriation in South African law, simply because
expropriation can only be undertaken by the state (or a person so authorized
in the place of the state) on the authority of legislation. There is no room in
98 Pope op cit note 1 at 541–2. At 551 Pope states that a court order to transfer the
land would amount to an expropriation. In Christie v Haarhoff supra note 38 at 356 the
court remarked that a solatium had to be paid because the transfer ‘practically
amounts to a compulsory expropriation’.
99 I assume that a rule of the common law satisﬁes the requirement in s 25(1) that a
deprivation must be brought about by a law of general application; see S v Thebus
2003 (6) SA505 (CC) paras 64–5.
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South African law for judicial expropriation without authority.100 Generally
speaking, therefore, instances where someone loses property by operation of
law and on the authority of the common law are to be treated as instances of
deprivation of property that must comply with the non-arbitrariness
requirement in s 25(1). Undoubtedly many (or all) instances where someone
loses property by way of forced transfer in terms of the operation of the
common law will also involve a real loss of property, but it is clear by now
that the distinction between deprivation and expropriation cannot simply be
based on the presence or absence of such loss. Expropriation is characterized
by the forced transfer of property to the state, for a public purpose, on the
basis of the state’s power of eminent domain and according to established
expropriation procedures, contained in legislation. According to the FNB
decision of the Constitutional Court, challenges based on s 25 analysis should
in any event begin with a consideration of deprivation in terms of s 25(1) and
it can probably also be assumed that there is very little, if any, possibility that
the US doctrine of ‘regulatory taking’, ‘inverse condemnation’ or (more
suitably for South African circumstances) indirect or constructive expropria-
tion would be accepted or imported into South African law.101 A forced
transfer that does not amount to a proper (authorized and intended)
expropriation for a public purpose and also clearly exceeds the boundaries of
a deprivation will probably not ground a claim for compensation (as in US
regulatory takings cases), but rather establish a case for the invalidity of the
deprivation in issue (as in German law). The rules of the common law that
govern encroachment must therefore ﬁrst of all comply with the require-
ments for a valid deprivation in terms of s 25(1).
The most signiﬁcant requirement in s 25(1), for present purposes, is that
deprivation of property should not be arbitrary. In the FNB case102 the
Constitutional Court explained what this requirement means: a deprivation
of property is arbitrary in terms of s 25(1) if there is inadequate reason for it.
In the context of encroachment, the reason that is required has to be
evaluated in view of the discretion that the courts exercise in this regard The
question that they are obliged to ask is this: when do the circumstances,
particularly the balance of loss and inconvenience, justify a solution that
involves overriding ownership rights and replacing them with monetary
compensation, purely to avoid causing a greater loss for the encroaching
party than the landowner would suffer if the encroachment is kept intact?
From the discussion above it is clear that the answer to this question can only
100 Gildenhuys op cit note 40 at 9–10; Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 (3) SA
250 (A) at 258G. See President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty)
Ltd (Agri SA and Others,Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA3 (CC) para 63.
101 See Van derWalt op cit note 48 at 209ff. I am indebted to GregoryAlexander for
conﬁrming that a taking would not be found in these cases in US law, for much the
same reasons. The reference to the FNB case is given the in next note.
102 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768
(CC) para 100.
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be given with clarity if the court takes a number of considerations into
account.
The ﬁrst factor that will have to be taken into account to ensure that the
court’s exercise of its discretion is not arbitrary is the scope of the
encroachment.103 If the encroachment is really small or insigniﬁcant there is
a simple choice: the matter could be solved by applying either a property rule
(demolition; especially when demolition causes hardly any loss or incon-
venience for the encroacher, while continued existence of the encroachment
causes some harm or loss for the affected landowner) or a liability rule
(compensation; especially when encroachment causes hardly any loss or
inconvenience for the affected landowner, whereas demolition would cause
disproportionately greater loss or inconvenience or harm for the encroacher
or for society). If the encroachment is signiﬁcant or massive or total,
application of a liability rule (compensation) might be easier to justify in most
circumstances, since the balance of loss or inconvenience would almost
always indicate compensation rather than demolition of signiﬁcant building
works. The only exception would be where the encroachment is reasonably
easy and cheap to remove and where the affected landowner attaches greater
value to the land than the encroacher attaches to not demolishing the
encroachment — opting for a compensation order in those circumstances
might be more difﬁcult to justify.
The second factor is the attitude of the parties. If the encroacher was
acting with malice, in bad faith or with gross negligence, the liability rule
does not seem to be an option. This observation is conﬁrmed by the fact that
injunctive relief seems to be the remedy of choice in most other legal systems
under these conditions. If the affected owner was aware of the encroachment
and did not protest immediately or reasonably quickly, acquiescence could
be assumed and a property rule (and even a liability rule) might be excluded
completely. This sub-rule also indicates that there is a very strong
presumption against a property rule when the encroachment had been in
place for a considerable time (in Roman-Dutch law one year and one day
was used as a rule of thumb).104 If the affected owner insists on demolition
out of pure malice, the court should be swayed towards a liability rule.
The third, and apparently often decisive, factor is the balance of loss or
inconvenience. In modern law this seems to be the main consideration,
although Gray & Gray (on the strength of English case law) prefer to ask
whether injunctive relief would be oppressive for the encroacher. If
demolition would cause much greater loss or harm for the encroacher (or
arguably for society) than the loss or harm the landowner would suffer if the
103 Pope op cit note 1 regards this as an important consideration that should guide
the court in its decision to suspend attachment rules and apply encroachment rules.
104 Cilliers & van der Merwe op cit note 1 concluded that the year-and-a-day-rule
was not adopted in South African law, and this was conﬁrmed in Rand Waterraad v
Bothma supra note 1 at 130. The rule, which functioned as a prescriptive principle,
formed part of local law and not general Roman-Dutch law.
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encroachment is left intact and the landowner is protected by a compensa-
tion order only, a liability rule is preferable. The approach here seems to be
that a liability rule is preferable whenever the case is adequately covered by
payment of suitable compensation. The ﬂip side is probably that a liability
rule is less attractive when leaving the encroachment in place is unjustiﬁably
oppressive for the affected innocent landowner, regardless of the amount of
compensation. The court’s judgement on this issue would in many cases
inform the subsequent decision on arbitrariness as well.
The constitutional argument would, in view of the FNB decision,
probably follow the logic of the factors above: if denial of injunctive relief
and restriction of the landowner’s rights to compensatory relief can be
justiﬁed with reference to the balance of loss and inconvenience, considering
all the circumstances, it should be possible to argue that there is sufﬁcient
reason for the resulting deprivation of property that the landowner would
undoubtedly suffer if injunctive relief were to be denied. This conclusion
should, however, be qualiﬁed. First, it is necessary to bolster the court’s
evaluation of the balance of loss and inconvenience with factors such as the
ﬁrst two set out above — if the encroacher was acting improperly from the
outset and the landowner was not, the court should be extra careful not to
allow the deprivation too easily. Secondly, note should be taken of the
sentiment, formulated in the German constitutional case law, that the mere
existence or availability of compensation does not in itself justify unilateral,
involuntary loss of property.105 Apart from the question whether the amount
of compensation satisﬁes the exigencies of the case, it should also be asked
whether the reason for the deprivation, in other words the result of the
balancing test, justiﬁes the deprivation. It is important to consider here Carol
Rose’s explanation106 of the purpose of property rules and of the reason why
we do not simply replace all property rules with liability rules: in most
property disputes it is preferable to leave the choice between enforcement of
the property interest and satisfaction with the compensation to the property
owner, because that is the only way in which the law can encourage
individual investment, planning and effort with regard to property. That
preference should only change when the affected landowner clearly acts
purely out of malice. In all instances, removing the choice to negotiate a
different outcome from the affected landowner and allowing the encroacher
alone to decide whether to enforce the transfer or to abate is probably
questionable. In this regard the modern Dutch and German solution, which
upholds the encroachment but gives the owner the choice to enforce a
transfer of the land, is always more readily justiﬁable.
Finally, combining a compensation award with an order to transfer the
land to the encroacher is a serious and extraordinary step in South African
law. Such an order would have to be justiﬁed under s 25(1) separately from
105 Supra note 48.
106 Op cit note 89.
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the decision to deny injunctive relief, and special care should be taken to
consider the effect that such an order would doubtlessly have on decisions to
invest in property. It should not easily be accepted that the affected
landowner has to be satisﬁed with receiving compensation — involuntary
loss of property is sometimes necessary and unavoidable in property law, but
it should not be treated lightly and it must be justiﬁed properly in every
individual instance. Considering all these factors, and given the slight
historical and doctrinal authority for the proposition that the courts have the
power to order a forced transfer of the land to the encroacher, I tend towards
the view that there is insufﬁcient authority for this proposition in South
African law and that it would always be difﬁcult to provide sufﬁcient reason
for such an involuntary loss in the absence of stronger authority. In my view,
such an order is open to an attack on the non-arbitrariness requirement in
s 25(1), simply because there is insufﬁcient authority for the courts exercising
such a radical discretion in the absence of legislation.
It should be said that decisions to uphold an encroachment and award
monetary compensation to the affected landowner could, even in the
absence of an ancillary order to transfer the land, also be open to attack for
establishing an arbitrary deprivation of property where the choice in favour
of a liability rule effectively deprives the affected landowner of all possible use
of her land. If the encroachment is so large as to immunize effectively the
land, it is conceivable that a monetary award could effectively transfer
ownership without even mentioning the subject. I would suggest that s 25(1)
scrutiny of decisions of that nature should be particularly careful.
CONCLUSIONS
Generally speaking, it seems as if South African law has taken a decisive step
towards acceptance of liability rules in encroachment cases. Despite — in fact
contrary to — the traditional rhetoric, injunctive relief does not appear to be
the default remedy in cases where the encroachment is signiﬁcant and a
compensation award is much more likely. Enforcement of the landowner’s
right to have encroachments on her land demolished seems to be restricted to
cases where the encroachment is insigniﬁcant (either in size or value) or
where it had been erected in bad faith. Moreover, there is authority for the
proposition that SouthAfrican courts can, in suitable cases, order the affected
land to be transferred to the encroacher, although the authority for this
proposition seems insufﬁcient and unconvincing in the absence of legisla-
tion. If an order for transfer of the land does not accompany a monetary
compensation award, the affected land still belongs to its original owner and
the normal operation of attachment is apparently suspended, so that the
encroaching building attaches to its land of origin and merely intrudes upon
the affected land without attaching to it. It is uncertain whether the
encroacher acquires a personal right or a kind of servitude over the affected
land. In either case the courts would have to identify sufﬁcient reasons for
the deprivation of property (ownership or another right) to prevent the
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infringement from being an arbitrary deprivation in terms of s 25(1) of the
Constitution. It was suggested above that it should be possible to prove
non-arbitrariness in at least some cases where the encroachment is upheld
against compensation, but that it would be much more difﬁcult, if not
impossible, to defeat an allegation of arbitrariness with regard to a forced
transfer by court order. Both decisions constitute deprivations rather than
expropriation of land and the monetary compensation order can probably
mostly be justiﬁed satisfactorily as not conﬂicting with the non-arbitrariness
requirement in s 25(1) of the Constitution, depending upon the reasons for
the court’s decision and the circumstances, but the order to transfer the land
is insufﬁciently authorized in South African law and establishes such a
dramatic interference with ownership that it could well be argued to be
arbitrary.
It is clear that the South African courts have relied upon, and been
inﬂuenced by, English law in coming to the conclusions that shaped the law
of encroachment as it stands. The positive side of that conclusion is that the
principles according to which the courts exercise their discretion to award
compensation instead of injunctive relief are fairly sophisticated. The
negative side is that the respective rights of the affected landowner and the
encroacher are unclear and that the authority for the order to transfer the
land to the encroacher is questionable, since neither of these aspects feature
to any signiﬁcant degree in English law. In other Roman-Germanic systems
(German and Dutch law) these shortcomings have been rectiﬁed by explicit
provisions in the respective civil codes. The most attractive aspects of the
relevant provisions is that the infringement constituted by the encroachment
is treated as a limited real right created by operation of law; that payment of
compensation for that right is regulated by the civil code; and that the
affected landowner is given a choice to accept this situation (establishment of
a real right in favour of the encroacher over her land, against compensation
in the nature of a rent) or to insist that the land be bought from her at a fair
price.
South African law with regard to encroachment would beneﬁt from
greater clarity about the respective rights of the encroacher and the affected
landowner in cases where injunctive relief is denied. It would be a great
improvement if it were clear that the encroacher acquires some kind of
limited right over the affected land and that the landowner’s right to receive
compensation equally establishes a real right over the encroacher’s land or
building (if compensation is payable in the form of an annual rent instead of a
one-off sum). It is essential that the choice whether to transfer the affected
land to the encroacher should be left to the affected owner, instead of it being
in the discretion of the courts. These changes should probably all be brought
about by legislation, which could then also bring greater clarity about the
considerations that inﬂuence the decision when to deny injunctive relief and
grant compensation instead (always, or just when the balance of loss favours
the encroacher?) and the basis for calculation of compensation (both for
denial of injunctive relief and for forced sale of the land). In the meantime,
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the courts should be careful with orders that deny the affected landowner
injunctive relief, especially in large or total encroachments, and they should
abstain completely from ordering forced transfer of the affected land to the
encroacher.
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